Federal Express’ Six-Month Limitation on Statutes of Limitations in Employment Disputes Approved

In Wilkerson v. Federal Express, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59708 (D. Md. June 2, 2011), Judge Alexander Williams approved a contractual limitation clause which provided that any claim against Federal Express had to be brought within the earlier of the time prescribed by law or six months.  The Court found, as previously the Maryland Court of Special Appeals had in Coll. of Notre Dame of Md., Inc. v. Morabito Consultants, Inc., 752 A.2d 265 (2000), that “there is nothing in the policy or object of such statutes which forbids the parties to an agreement to provide a shorter period, provided the time is not unreasonably short.”  The Wilkerson Court adopted the criteria used by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in assessing the reasonableness of a provision shortening statutes of limitations.  The three criteria being:

1. There is no controlling statute to the contrary
2. It is reasonable; and
3. It is not subject to other defenses such as fraud, duress, or misrepresentation.

Morabito, 752 A.2d at 174.  The Court found that, were it not for the contractual limitation, the statute of limitations would be three years in the case before it.  Nonetheless, the Court found the six-month time period to be reasonable, indicating that the clause was written in bold, capitalized letters; was not hidden in any way; and that there were no apparent statutes preventing such a shortening of the statute of limitations.  

The Wilkinson opinion appears to be consistent with the line of authorities about which we previously blogged. 

Can an Employer in the Employment Application Shorten the Statute of Limitations for Anti-Discrimination Claims?

The answer, rather uniformly, is affirmative. Recently, in Dunn v. Gordon Food Services, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13387 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 10, 2011), Chief Judge Russell upheld the employer's shortening of the statute of limitations where the employment application with Ms. Dunn, on its last page, had eleven clauses to which the applicant had to agree as a condition of being considered for employment, and the fourth clause stated that the applicant agreed "that any action or suit against [the employer] arising out of any employment or termination of employment, including but not limited to claims arising under the State or Federal civil rights statutes, must be brought within one year of the event giving rise to the claim or be forever barred."  This clause went on to state that the applicant "waive[d] any statute of limitations to the contrary."  The Court, citing a plethora of authorities, both inside and outside the Sixth Circuit upholding such provisions, sustained the defense motion for summary judgment based on that clause.  See also Ravenscraft v. BNP Media, Inc., No. 09-C-6617, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37919, 2010 WL 1541455, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2010); PSC Info Group v. Lason, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 577, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Cole v. Federal Exp. Corp., No. CV-06-3485, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71431, 2008 WL 4307090, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008); Vincent v. Comerica Bank, No. H-05-2302, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28613, 2006 WL 1295494, *5-6 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2006); Badgett v. Federal Express Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 613 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Fink v. Guardsmark, LLC, No. CV 03-1480-BR, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16970, 2004 WL 1857114, at *1 (D. Or. Aug. 19, 2004); Johnson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. C.A. 02-69 GMS, 2003 WL 1089394, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 6, 2003).

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