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Friday, April 15, 2016
Courts Continue to Expand What Single Events May Constitute Hostile Work Environment
We have written two blogs (here
and here)
over the past several years on the subject of single-incident acts constituting
the basis for a hostile work environment (HWE) claim.
A host of courts have held in recent years that a single
racial slur may well be sufficient to plead a HWE claim. See
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Smith v. D.C. Office of Human Rights, 77
A.3d 980 (D.C. 2013) (the “b-word”).
A series of articles, set forth below, contain citations to
scores of other appellate and trial court decisions that have addressed the
issue. See Eugene Volokh, What
Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 Geo.
L.J. 627 (1997) (available at: http://www2.law.ucla.edu/volokh/harass/breadth.htm);
Karen M. Buesing, Shayla Waldon, Workplace
Harassment: When Will a Court Say That Your Employees Have Had Enough?, ABA
Section of Labor and Employment Law, Ninth Annual Conference (Nov. 4-7, 2015)
(available at: http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2015/november/annual/papers/15.authcheckdam.pdf);
Debra D. Burke, Workplace Harassment: A
Proposal for a Bright Line Test Consistent With the First Amendment
(Available Online at: http://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/law_labor_burke_vol21no2.pdf).
Two recent decisions from Maryland and the District of
Columbia underscore the dramatic expansion of HWE claims in the wake of the
Fourth-Circuit’s Boyer-Liberto
decision and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Ayissi-Etoh. In the wake of Boyer-Liberto, Judge James K.
Bredar, in Tiffany Jones v. Family Health
Ctr. of Balt., Inc., No. JKB-14-762, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130818 (D. Md.
Sept. 29, 2015) denied summary judgment to the defense, stating that Boyer-Liberto had “changed the landscape”
such that a single instance of physical touching was held to be sufficient to
overcome a Rule 56 summary judgment motion.
Judge Bredar relied upon the following facts to deny summary judgment:
[Plaintiff] stepped outside [the room]...[o]n
her way back, as she walked through the lunchroom and toward a door that opened
into the clinic’s waiting room, Plaintiff felt [her supervisor] behind her: he “got
up on [her] so close, [she] felt his private parts on…[her] buttocks.” Plaintiff also felt [supervisor’s] hand on
her waist…Plaintiff reported the incident to [another supervisor] who allowed
her to “go home” and “get [her]self together.
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan of the federal district court in the
District of Columbia, in Kruger v. Cogent
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 14-1744, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41822, (D.D.C. March 30,
2016) found that the CEO’s alleged reference to Mr. Kruger as a “Nazi” may be
severe enough in itself to state a hostile work environment claim. Based on that finding, relying upon Ayissi-Etoh, the Court denied the defense’s
motion to dismiss. Judge Sullivan
further found that an alleged intentional “public display of hostility towards
Mr. Kruger” was a factor to consider in determining whether Mr. Kruger had pled
a plausible HWE claim. The public
display of hostility was the allegation that the CEO acknowledged other
employees with “at least an appropriately cordial greeting” but would “consistently
ignore Mr. Kruger and refused to engage in any type of normal workplace
pleasantry.” Judge Sullivan found that
the allegation that Mr. Kruger’s “supervisor refused to engage in work place
pleasantries added further strength to his hostile work environment claims.” Possibly, in contrast, see Satterwhite v. City of Houston, 602 Fed. Appx. 585 (5th Cir.
2015) (a single reference to an employee as “Hitler” was found to be
insufficient.).
Based on the continuing expansion of the circumstances that
may be sufficient to plead an HWE claim, employers would be wise to have an aggressive
zero-tolerance policy; well communicated internal complaint mechanisms; a
requirement that co-workers report any inappropriate conduct or comments
observed by them; prompt investigations of any such reports; training on a
periodic basis to remind employees of their policies in this regard; and
discipline, where appropriate, that sends a message to all concerned that the
company’s policies are being aggressively enforced and not are merely window
dressing.
Please be sure to visit our website at http://RobertBFitzpatrick.com
Posted by Robert B. Fitzpatrick at 5:54 PM 9 comments
Friday, February 12, 2016
The Fourth Circuit Loves Plaintiff's Lawyers
Valentine, Valentine,
Valentine
O’ won’t you please be
mine
You’re such a
sweetheart
With love full of
sweet tarts
This Valentine’s day is particularly sweet for the
plaintiff-employee bar, as the Fourth Circuit repeatedly, in recent times, has
been issuing opinions that are quite favorable to employees. We review a dozen such opinions, maybe better
described as a dozen “red roses” or a dozen chocolate coated strawberries:
Our first case is Cruz
v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2014) in which Judge Gregory, writing for
the panel, held that the failure to post the DoL-issued notice of FLSA rights
in a conspicuous place in the workplace can result in the tolling of the FLSA
statute of limitations. In doing so, the
Court was reaffirming its holding in Vance
v. Whirlpool Corp., 716 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1983), in which a panel of that
Court had found the 180-day filing requirement of ADEA was tolled by reason of
the employer’s failure to post the statutory notice of rights under ADEA. In addition to the foregoing holding, the
panel also held that when a statute of limitations is extended by the
legislature, unless the legislature explicitly states otherwise, the extension
applies retroactively to any claim under the statute at issue that had not
expired under the old limitations statute at the time the legislation extending
the statute was enacted.
Our second case is Lorenzo
v. Prime Commc’ns, L.P., 806 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 2015), in which Judge
Niemeyer, writing for the panel, held that an arbitration clause contained in
an employee handbook that also contained a contractual disclaimer was
unenforceable under North Carolina law.
In addition, the Court held that a class-action certification order is
appealable under Federal Civil Rule 23(f) only if the interlocutory appeal is
filed within fourteen calendar days of the entry of the class certification
order. In Lorenzo, counsel mistakenly filed seventeen days after the entry of
the order, apparently thinking that the client got three extra days for
“service”. The Court emphasized that the
language of Rule 23(f) does not permit the three additional days, as time runs
from the entry of the order, not from any form of service. Of course, the appeal is ultimately
permissive, as the Court of Appeals must grant permission to review if an
interlocutory appeal request is timely made.
Earlier, in 2013, the Court, Judge Davis writing for the
panel, in Noohi v. Toll Bros., 708
F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2013), applied Maryland law to hold that a one-sided
arbitration agreement lacked mutuality of consideration. There, in a non-employment case, the
purchaser was required to arbitrate disputes, but the seller was not. In so doing, the Court relied on Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atl., Inc.,
378 Md. 139, 835 A.2d 656 (2003) (holding that an “employer’s unfettered
discretion to change the arbitration agreement rendered its promise to
arbitrate illusory.”)
Our third case is Pryor
v. United Airlines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 2015). In Pryor,
the Fourth Circuit, with Judge Gregory writing for the panel, held that the
employer could be held liable for a hostile work environment created by an
anonymous harasser. Here, an
African-American flight attendant received a racist death threat anonymously
left in her company mailbox. She alleged
that United failed to adequately respond.
The panel reversed Judge Brinkema, of the Eastern District of Virginia,
who had granted summary judgment, and remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. Earlier, in 2014, in Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413
(4th Cir. 2014), Judge Shedd, writing for the panel with Judge Niemeyer
concurring in part and dissenting in part, the Court denied the employer’s
motion for summary judgment in a Title VII and Section 1981 race and gender
hostile work environment case, holding that there was a triable issue of fact
as to whether the employee was repeatedly subjected to unwelcome statements and
conduct by a customer, which created an abusive atmosphere, of which the
employer should have known and to which the employer failed to adequately
respond.
Our fourth case is Jacobs
v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2015). In Jacobs, Judge Floyd, writing for the panel,
held that the employer had not properly accommodated the plaintiff’s
disability, social anxiety disorder. In
doing so, the Court made a number of important holdings, including:
- “Interacting with others” is a major life activity;
- The amended ADA rejected, as imposing “too high a standard” the old rule that to prove a disability, one needed to show that the plaintiff was “significantly restricted” in a major life activity. Here, the Court held: “A person need not live as a hermit in order to be ‘substantially limited’ in interacting with others”;
- Temporal proximity of three weeks, alone, can establish causation;
- Piling on can be proof of pretext where, as here, the defense stated multiple reasons for termination at the time of termination, and then added more before EEOC, and yet more before the district court;
- The failure to document may be evidence of pretext. As the Court noted here: “Even more striking is that no one at the [employer] documented any of the justifications (including those raised at the time of termination) in any way”;
- The Court permitted surreptitious tape recordings into evidence, and heavily relied upon them in finding genuine factual disputes;
- A reasonable accommodation may require job restructuring; and
- A failure to discuss Plaintiff’s accommodation request could be found to be an act of bad faith.
Our fifth case is Reyazuddin
v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 789 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2015), in which Judge Diaz
wrote for the panel. In this
Rehabilitation Act case, under Section 504 thereof, a blind employee challenged
the manner in which the County utilized software in a new call center, software
that was not accessible to blind employees.
Summary judgment having been entered below, the panel found that the
lower court, on remand, should further explore the undue hardship defense put
forth by the County. In addition, there
is one subsidiary holding favorable to the defense in which the Court held that
public employers are not subject to suit for disability employment
discrimination under Title II of the ADA.
Our sixth case is Butler
v. Drive Automotive Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2015),
Judge Floyd writing for the panel. In Butler the Court held that Title VII
provides for joint employer liability.
In so holding, the Court articulated the so-called “hybrid” test for
joint employment.
Our seventh case is Brown
v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2015), Judge Gregory writing a
sixty-three page opinion for the majority, and Judge Agee writing a ninety-page
dissent. The majority, Judges Gregory
and Keenan, vacated the lower court’s decertification of a discriminatory job
promotion class action and remanded to the District Court with instructions to
certify the class.
Earlier, the Court, in 2013, in Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 2013),
with Judge Gregory writing for the majority and Judge Wilkinson dissenting, the
majority distinguished Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), finding that the district court
erred in holding that Wal-Mart
precluded allegations of “general policy” discrimination.
Our eighth case is Foster
v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015), Judge Floyd writing
for the panel, in which the Court held that the 2013 Supreme Court decision in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) did not alter
the McDonnell-Douglas analysis for
retaliation claims.
Our ninth case is DeMasters
v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2015), a highly unusual case in
which all members of the Fourth Circuit recused themselves and a panel composed
entirely of judges from the Third Circuit heard the case. Judge Krause, writing for that panel,
rejected the so-called “Manager Rule”, a rule invoked by management to prevent
an employee whose job responsibilities include reporting discrimination claims
from seeking protection under Title VII’s anti-retaliation clause.
Our tenth case is Bland
v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013) in which Chief Judge Traxler, wrote
for the majority (Judge Hollander concurred in part and dissented in part) and
held that, where a sheriff refused to reappoint one of his deputies because the
deputy had “liked” his opponent on Facebook, the Facebook “like” constituted
“pure speech” and a form of “symbolic expression” which was protected under the
First Amendment.
Our eleventh case is Summers
v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2014), Judge Motz writing
for the panel, held that the Congress, amending the ADA, intended to cover
temporary disabilities, thus permitting the plaintiff, who had been injured
while exiting a commuter train on the way to work, to proceed with his ADA
case.
Our twelfth case is Boyer-Liberto
v. Fontainebleau, 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015). Judge King writing for twelve judges, with
Judge Niemeyer dissenting writing for three judges, held that a co-worker’s use
of the epithet “porch monkey”, standing alone, was sufficiently severe such
that a reasonable jury could find there to be a racially hostile work
environment.
Posted by Robert B. Fitzpatrick at 7:12 PM 3 comments
Friday, January 15, 2016
Never Darken My Door Clause Stricken by Federal Court
On January
6, 2016, U.S. District Court Judge Lorna G. Schofield of the Southern District
of New York rejected a proposed FLSA settlement agreement which contained a
no-rehire clause. Reyes v. HIP at Murray
Street, LLC, S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2016 (unreported online; copy attached tothis blog).
The Court
found that the clause precluding future employment was “a highly restrictive
provision in strong tension with the remedial purposes of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (‘FLSA’)…” In so holding, the Court
relied on Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake
House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied No. 15-605, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 356 (Jan. 11, 2016). See Jessica
Perry, Kathryn Mantoan, and Clayton Flaherty, “Please Pass the Settlement”,
Employment Law and Litigation Blog (Dec. 7, 2015) (available at: http://blogs.orrick.com/employment/2015/12/07/please-pass-the-settlement-second-circuit-widens-split-over-stipulated-flsa-dismissals/).
Cheeks described various other cases
that had found various clauses of proposed FLSA settlements to be
offensive. For example, in Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, a
proposed FLSA settlement included a confidentiality provision, a global
release, and a clause establishing that the plaintiff’s attorney would receive
between 40% and 43.6% of the total settlement payment without adequate
documentation to support such a fee award. 96 F. Supp. 3d 170 (S.D.N.Y. March
30, 2015) (Kaplan, J.). In Lopez, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan disapproved
the settlement. The Court similarly
found that the “highly restrictive confidentiality provisions…are in strong
tension with the remedial purposes of the FLSA.” Id.
at 177. While criticizing many aspects
of the confidentiality provisions, the Court took particular aim at those
provisions which would “bar plaintiffs from openly discussing their experiences
litigating this wage-and-hour case.” Id.
While recognizing the parties’ interest in confidentiality to encourage
settlement, the Court nonetheless concluded “the congressional purposes
underlying the FLSA change the calculus in cases like these. The FLSA evinces ‘Congress’ intent…both to
advance employees’ awareness of their FLSA rights and to ensure pervasive
implementation of the FLSA[.]’” Id. at 179-180.
The Court in Nights of Cabiria further held that global
releases were inappropriate in the context of FLSA settlements, remonstrating
that “[t]he Court will not countenance employers using FLSA settlements to
erase all liability whatsoever in exchange for partial payment of wages
allegedly required by statute.” Id. at 181. As to the attorneys’ fees, Judge Kaplan
explained that “[i]t may be that counsel’s fee request is entirely commensurate
with the amount of time that the lawyers spent on this case. But such determinations require evidence, and
plaintiff’s counsel has provided none.
The fee request therefore cannot be approved.” Id.
at 182.
In Guareno v. Vincent Perito, Inc., Judge William
H. Pauley of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York also rejected a proposed FLSA settlement.
No. 14-cv-01635, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144038 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2014). In Guareno,
the Court listed numerous concerns with the proposed settlement agreement, but
appeared particularly concerned about the presence of an unethical agreement
that the plaintiff’s attorney would not represent, in the future, any person
bringing similar claims against the defendant.
Id. at *3-*4. Finding that such a restriction “contravenes
the FLSA’s intent to permit plaintiffs to bring suit on behalf of themselves
and ‘other employees similarly situated[,]’” the Court noted that “[s]uch a
provision raises the specter of defendants settling FLSA claims with
plaintiffs, perhaps at a premium, in order to avoid a collective action….from
other employees whose rights have been similarly violated.” Id.
at *4.
In Nall v. Mal-Motels, Inc., the Court
first determined that the principle in Lynn’s
Food applied to settlements involving former employees, in addition to
those involving current employees. 723
F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2013). The
Court went on to reject the settlement, focusing on concerns regarding
inequalities in bargaining power between current or former employees and
employers. Id. In Nall the settlement was reached between the defendant and the
plaintiff, apparently without the “knowledge or participation” of plaintiff’s
counsel. Id. at 1308. In rejecting
the settlement, the Court reasoned that the FLSA’s protections were “mandatory”
and “not subject to negotiation or bargaining between employers and
employees.” Id. at 1307 quoting Lynn’s
Food, 679 F.2d at 1352. Finally, the
Court reasoned that “[a]llowing the employer to escape liquidated damages by
simply giving an employee the wages she was entitled to earn in the first place
– or in some cases, less than that – would undermine the deterrent effect of
the statutory provisions.” Id.
In Walker v. Vital Recovery Servs., the
Court declined to accept offers of judgment because “the record [was] presently
insufficient to perform the judicial review required by Lynn’s Food. 300 F.R.D. 599
at 604 (M.D. Ga. 2014). The Court also
noted that the offers of judgment were, for the most part, of $100.00,
compensated plaintiffs for only one of several of their theories of recovery,
and that many of the accepting plaintiffs “are unemployed and desperate for any
money they can find.” Id.
In most
cases, the Plaintiff is free to voluntarily dismiss his suit, without court
order, by “entering a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(ii). This avenue has long
been unavailable to FLSA plaintiffs. See Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1353 (citing D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328
U.S. 108 n.8 (1944)). The issue in Cheeks was whether, and when, the courts or the U.S. Department of
Labor must review and approve FLSA settlements and attendant stipulated
dismissals of FLSA claims. In Cheeks, the parties attempted to settle
their FLSA claims by filing a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice pursuant
to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). In so doing,
they argued that FLSA actions may be settled by stipulation without court
review. The Rule provides that actions
may be dismissed without a court order “[s]ubject to…any applicable federal
statute”. In other words, Rule 41
recognizes that some actions (those subject to an “applicable federal statute”)
may not be dismissed by stipulation
without a court order. The Court in Cheeks solicited the view of the
Department of Labor and it opined that the Fair Labor Standards Act falls
within the “applicable federal statute” exception. In Cheeks,
Judge Pooler joined by Judges Parker and Wesley, found that the FLSA is an
“applicable federal statute” within the meaning of Rule 41, and that,
therefore, the settlement needed to be reviewed and approved by the district
court. Other courts have similarly so
held. Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 679 F.2d
1350, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1982); Copeland
v. ABB, Inc., 521 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2008); Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 374 (4th Cir. 2005) aff’d 493 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2007) superceded by regulation on other grounds as
stated in Whiting v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 416 Fed. Appx. 312 (4th Cir.
2011); Walton v. United Consumers Club,
Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1986).
This area
has remained unaddressed by the Supreme Court for decades. The Court has noted, for example, that:
Our decision of the issues raised [in
liquidated damages waiver cases] has not necessitated a determination of what
limitation, if any Section 216(b) of the Act places on the validity of
agreements between an employer and employee to settle claims arising under the
Act if the settlement is made as the result of a bona fide dispute between the
two parties, in consideration of a bona fide compromise and settlement.
Brooklyn
Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 714 (1945). See also D.A.
Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 113 n.8, 116 (1946) (holding
that “neither wages nor the damages for withholding them are capable of
reduction by compromise of controversies over coverage,” but drawing a
distinction in dicta between a settlement agreement and a stipulated judgment
entered in the adversarial context of an employee’s suit for FLSA wages).
Although courts are generally
agreed that settlement is permissible when there is a bona fide dispute over liability, there is disagreement over
whether, and when, the settlement must be reviewed by a court to make that
determination. See, e.g., Jarrard v. Se. Shipbuilding Corp., 163 F.2d 960, 961
(5th Cir. 1947) (holding that the Supreme Court’s decisions in O’Neil and Schulte regarding settlements did not prohibit approval of a
“solemn and binding stipulated judgment entered upon disputed issues of both
law and fact” in an FLSA suit brought by employees); Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353
(11th Cir. 1982) (“When employees bring a private action for back wages under
the FLSA, and present to the district court a proposed settlement, the district
court may enter a stipulated judgment after scrutinizing the settlement for fairness.”)
(citing Schulte, 328 U.S. at 113 n.8;
Jarrard, 163 F.2d at 961).
The Fifth Circuit stands in
conflict on this issue with most other courts to have considered this
question. In Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., LLC, the Fifth Circuit held that
private settlement of FLSA claims is permissible when either the settlement
“gave employees everything to which they are entitled under the FLSA at the
time the agreement is reached[,]” or, more significantly, when “there exists a
bona fide dispute as to liability.” 688
F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012) quoting
Martinez v. Bohls Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 633-34 (W.D. Tex. 2005)
(bona fide dispute) and Thomas v.
Louisiana, 534 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1976) (full relief). In
Martin, the Court approved a private
settlement agreement containing a release of FLSA claims which had not been
submitted for review and approval by the district court or the Department of
Labor, and found that the employees had effectively waived their rights. Martin,
688 F.3d at 255.
Furthermore,
even in cases where courts have required court review and approval of FLSA
settlements, it is not entirely clear what standard should be followed in
conducting such a review. Some courts
have held that District Courts may enter a stipulated judgment approving the
settlement of FLSA claims only after the court has scrutinized the settlement
for fairness and reasonableness, and has expressly approved the settlement as
fair and reasonable. See, e.g., Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1353-55 (“When employees bring a
private action for back wages under the FLSA, and present to the district court
a proposed settlement, the district court may enter a stipulated judgment after
scrutinizing the settlement for fairness.”) (citing Schulte, 328 U.S. at 113 n.8; Jarrard,
163 F.2d at 961). See also Mosquera v. Masada Auto Sales, Ltd., No. 09-CV-4925
(NGG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7476, at *2-*3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan 25, 2011) (requiring
an evaluation of FLSA settlements for fairness and reasonableness); Lee
v. Timberland Co., No. C 07-2367 JF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108098, at *4-*5
(N.D. Cal. June 19, 2008) (same); Boone
v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“Because
the FLSA was enacted to protect workers from sub-standard wages or oppressive
working conditions, employees cannot waive their right to overtime wages unless
such a settlement is overseen by the Department of Labor or approved for
fairness and reasonableness by a district court.”) (citing Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1355).
Some
courts have further defined this fairness test by setting forth a list of
factors that courts should consider. For
example, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
has held that:
To determine
whether a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable under the FLSA, courts
should consider: “(1) the extent of discovery that has taken place; (2) the
stage of the proceedings, including the complexity, expense and likely duration
of the litigation; (3) the absence of fraud or collusion in the settlement; (4)
the experience of counsel who have represented the plaintiffs; . . . and ([5])
the probability of plaintiffs’ success on the merits and the amount of the
settlement in relation to the potential recovery.”
Belcher v. CHA Cos., Inc., No. 3:10cv420, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39063, at *2
(E.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2011) (quoting Lomascolo
v. Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc., No. I:08cv1310 (AJT/JFA), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89129, at *10 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2009)).
Until the Supreme Court might
rule otherwise – unless you are in the Fifth Circuit – counsel should assume
the following:
·
A private FLSA settlement agreement must be
approved by a district court or the Department of Labor.
·
After Reyes,
assume that a no-rehire clause, colloquially known as a “do not darken my door
again” clause, will be increasingly subject to attack.
·
Attorneys’ fees in any such settlement must be
justified. In the District of Columbia,
after the Circuit’s recent opinion in Eley
v. District of Columbia, the District’s bench is increasingly requiring substantial
justification of hourly rates. See 793 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Laffey
matrix and affidavit that counsel’s rates charged clients were within the
Laffey matrix found to be insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
requested rates were the rates prevailing in the community for similar
services); see also Collins v. District of Columbia, No.
15-cv-00136, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159890 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2015) (Judge Jackson
adopts MJ Kay’s report and recommendations regarding Fee Award in the wake of Eley); Devore on behalf of A.M. v. District of Columbia, 89 F. Supp. 3d
113 (D.D.C. 2015) (plaintiff could have done more to meet her burden to
establish the reasonableness of rates); Briggs
v. District of Columbia, 73 F.
Supp. 3d 59 (D.D.C. 2014) (Laffey rates are presumptive maximum rates for
complex federal litigation); Robinson v.
District of Columbia, 61 F. Supp. 3d 54 (D.D.C. 2014) (Laffey-matrix is
appropriate starting point for the “case by case analysis”); Brighthaupt v. District of Columbia, 36
F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014) (Laffey rate can be used as “an appropriate
starting point for determining rates of reimbursement for attorneys…” but Court
declines to award Laffey rates because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
such rates are the prevailing market rate); McAllister
v. District of Columbia, 21 F.
Supp. 3d 94 (D.D.C. 2014) (affidavits did not provide sufficient information
for the Court to determine whether the Laffey rates represented the market
rate).
·
Confidentiality clauses may well be
stricken. See Weismantle v. Jali, No. 2:13-cv-01187, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53435 (W.D. Pa. April 23, 2015) (“What can be gleaned from this prevailing, if
not overwhelming, caselaw trend is that, absent something very special in a
very specific case which generates a very good reason above and beyond the
desire of the parties to keep the terms of an FLSA settlement out of the
public’s view, if the parties want the Court to approve the substance of an
FLSA settlement agreement, it cannot be filed under seal”); Baker v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 940 (E.D. Va. 2011) (Judge
Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.).
·
Certainly, not only FLSA settlements, but no
settlement, should ever have a restriction on counsel’s availability to
represent future clients against the defendant.
See, e.g., D.C. R. Prof. C. 5.6(b)
(A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making…[a]n agreement in which a
restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a
controversy between parties.”)
Posted by Robert B. Fitzpatrick at 4:58 PM 8 comments
Friday, December 11, 2015
Court Recognizes Claim of National Origin Discrimination Based on Non-Hispanic Status and Rejects Heightened Proof Standard for Non-Minority Discrimination Claims
Among Title VII’s less-used provisions is its prohibition of discrimination on the basis of “national origin”, but the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Garcia v. Hatch Valley Pub. Schs. may breathe new life into the hoary prohibition. No. 33,310, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 120 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015). In Garcia, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed two questions under the New Mexico Human Rights Act which the Court held “tracks Title VII”. Id. The questions were: 1) is “non-Hispanic” a protected category; and 2) are plaintiffs in “reverse discrimination” cases subject to a heightened standard for making out a prima facie case of discrimination? Id. The Court held “non-Hispanic” to be a protected category and rejected the contention that “reverse discrimination” cases, in terms of burdens of proof, should be treated differently than cases brought by African-Americans and Hispanics.
In addressing the first question, the Court examined
the history of the use of “national origin” in discrimination claims. The Court noted that the Supreme Court
originally defined the term as the “country where a person was born, or…from
which his or her ancestors came.” Id. quoting Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973). Despite this
relatively narrow definition, the Court noted that the Espinoza Court noted that refusing to hire individuals of a
“Spanish-speaking background” constituted national origin discrimination. Garcia,
2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 120 at *7, quoting
Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 92, n5, 95.
Examining subsequent caselaw from around the nation, the Court explained
that “the concept of national origin…embrace[s] a broader class of people” and
is “better understood by reference to certain traits or characteristics that
can be linked to one’s place of origin, as opposed to a specific country or
nation.” Garcia, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 120 at *8, quoting Kanaji v. Children’s Hosp. of Phila., 276 F. Supp. 2d 399,
401-02 (E.D. Pa. 2003); see also Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,
840 F.2d 667, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that national origin
discrimination could include discrimination based on membership in ethnic
groups); Beltran v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 837 F. Supp. 2d
635, 641 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (stating that "Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination against any national origin group, including larger ethnic
groups, such as Hispanics" (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted).
In Garcia,
the plaintiff had accused the defendant of discriminating against him on the
basis of his national origin, alleging that he was German-descended and non-Hispanic. Garcia,
2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 120 at *1. The
lower court found that the employer had no knowledge of the plaintiff’s German
descent – and so could not have discriminated against him on that basis – but
failed to consider whether he had been discriminated against based on being
“non-Hispanic”. Id. In reversing the lower
court’s decision, the Court recognized that “[c]lassifications such as
Caucasian, white, and non-Hispanic have been widely accepted as protected in
cases involving national origin discrimination claims.” Id.
at *8, citing Turney v. Hyundai Constr. Equip. USA Inc., 482 F. App'x.
259, 260 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff who identified as
Caucasian "belongs to a protected class for purposes of his national
origin discrimination claim because Title VII applies to any racial group,
whether minority or majority" (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 703, 711, 717
(D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that the plaintiff who identified his national
origin as "Caucasian American of European descent" was a member of a
protected class); Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 639-40 (8th
Cir. 2002) (treating non-Hispanic as a protected class and reversing
summary judgment on the plaintiff's race and national origin discrimination
claims), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2003); Stern
v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 306, 312 (2d Cir.
1997) (finding that a "white American male of Eastern European
origin" satisfied a prima facie case for national origin
discrimination); Cameron v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 56
F. Supp. 2d 235, 238-39 (D. Conn. 1999) (memo.) (accepting classification
of "white, non-Hispanic male of Scottish/European origin" as
protected class for national origin discrimination claim (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Finding that the plaintiff’s contention that he was
“non-Hispanic” fell within the meaning of a “national origin” under Title VII,
the Court addressed whether the plaintiff had satisfied the elements of a prima facie case. In so doing, the Court noted that, as a
technical matter, the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, that a
plaintiff demonstrate that “he belongs to a racial minority” would foreclose a
claim of discrimination brought by a non-minority. Garcia,
2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 120 at *11 to *12. Relying on McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) the
Court found that Title VII should not be interpreted to foreclose claims of
“reverse discrimination” and moved instead to the more difficult question of
whether such claims were subject to a heightened standard. In so doing, the Court identified
essentially two different approaches to this question.
a.
The Heightened
Standard Approach
The
Court noted that some courts have held that, in cases of “reverse
discrimination” the plaintiff can make out a prima facie case only if she can show “background circumstances
that support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority.” Garcia, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 120 at *13 quoting Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (D.C. Cir. 1981). This approach, with minor differences, is
followed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
the Sixth Circuit, and the Eighth Circuit, as well as the states of New Jersey
and Ohio. Woods v. Perry, 375 F.3d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 2004); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc.,
770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985); Parker,
652 F.2d at 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Erickson
v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 569 A.2d 793, 799 (N.J. 1990); Jones v. MTD Consumer Group, Inc., 32
N.E.3d 1030 (Ohio 2015).
Although
following the heightened standard approach, the Tenth Circuit has created a “modified”
background and circumstances test. This
test permits the plaintiff to make a prima
facie case either through the “background circumstances” described above or
by showing that there is “indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable
probability, that but for the plaintiff’s status [as a member of the majority]
the challenged [action] would have favored the plaintiff.” Garcia,
2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 120 at *15, quoting
Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d 585, 589 (10th Cir. 1992).
The Garcia Court criticized the heightened
standard approach for imposing a higher standard on majority plaintiffs than
minority plaintiffs, and would require the Court to “determine which groups are
socially favored andd which are socially disfavored.” Garcia,
2015 N.M. App. LEXIS at *17, quoting
Collins v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (W.D. Mo.
1990). In so holding, the Court noted
that this fact was “difficult to reconcile” with the decision of the United
States Supreme Court, which had adopted a broad, holistic interpretation of
Title VII. See Furnco Const. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957
(1978) (stating that the prima facie case, as stated in McDonnell
Douglas, "was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic" and that the "central focus of the inquiry in a
[discrimination] case . . . is always whether the employer is treating some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin" (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); see also McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6, 280 n.8
(1976) (holding that "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against
the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they [members of
a racial minority]" and noting that the specification of the prima facie
proof required under McDonnell Douglas “is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations" (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
b.
Rejection of the
Heightened Standard
The
Court noted that many courts, including the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits, have rejected the heigtened standard approach. McGuinness
v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2001); Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001);
Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc.,
209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000); Iadimarco
v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999); Lucas
v. Dole, 835 F.2d 532, 533 (4th Cir. 1987).
The Third Circuit requires only that the plaintiff provide sufficient
evidence “to allow a fact finder to conclude that the employer is treating her
less favorably than others based upon a [protected] trait” while the Second,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits merely require that the plaintiff
demonstrate that they belong to a protected group, whether or not they are in a
“minority class”. Garcia, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 120 at *20.
c.
The Holding
The Garcia court rejected the heightened
standard, and joined the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in
requiring only that the plaintiff demonstrate that he belongs to a “protected
group”. Garcia, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 120 at *25. In doing so, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
stated that plaintiff is not required to meet a heightened standard, as the
purpose and philosophy behind Title VII holds discrimination and reverse
discrimination plaintiffs to the same standards, citing Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (stating that
"[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and
thus call for the most exacting judicial examination" and "the level
of scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification
operates against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental
discrimination"); see
also Bass, 256 F.3d at 1103 ("`Our
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law.'") (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("In the eyes of government, we are
just one race here. It is American."); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978)
(plurality opinion) ("The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color.").
The
Court went on to apply this standard. It
found that the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination based on being “non-Hispanic”
was a cognizable claim of national origin discrimination, and that the evidence
adduced satisfied the elements of a prima
facie case. Id. at *28 to *29.
d.
Take-Aways
As
the New Mexico decision is but one decision from an intermediate appellate
court from one of our fifty states, it, in essence, only underscores, the
plethora of open issues in national origin discrimination cases, including:
1)
What is the
standard of proof for Caucasians and/or non-Hispanics, sometimes referred to as
majority litigants?
2)
What deference,
if any, ought the courts give to the EEOC’s Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1?
3)
When can national
origin preferential treatment be treated as a bfoq?
4)
Is so-called
“ethnic discrimination” national origin discrimination under the Act?
5)
After the Supreme
Court’s decision in Espinoza, can
alienage discrimination be successfully challenged, under Title VII or
otherwise?
6)
When is “accent”
discrimination recognized as national origin discrimination?
7)
When, if ever, is
bi-lingual or multi-lingual discrimination or preferential treatment found to
be national origin discrimination?
The
New Mexico decision is welcome in that it rekindles the ongoing debate
regarding the breadth of the prohibition against national origin
discrimination. Clearly, it is not the
last word, and clearly many, many issues remain unresolved.
Please be sure to visit our website at http://RobertBFitzpatrick.com
Posted by Robert B. Fitzpatrick at 4:59 PM 4 comments
Friday, November 13, 2015
The Cat's Paw Takes A Swipe at But-For Causation
After the Supreme Court’s decision in University of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), holding that but-for causation is the standard for proving retaliation in a Title VII case, many thought that there was an open question as to whether the holding in Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011), the so-called “Cat’s Paw” case, would apply in a but-for causation context. In Staub the Court held that, if the discriminating employee proximately caused the ultimate decisionmaker’s adverse action, then the “Cat’s” discriminatory intent would be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker even though the decisionmaker was not consciously discriminating.
So far, four circuits have weighed in on this question, unanimously concluding that even after Nassar, plaintiffs may use a “Cat’s Paw” theory even in Title VII retaliation cases. See Zamora v. City of Houston, 798 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2015); EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1070 (6th Cir. 2015); Ward v. Jewell, 772 F.3d 1199, 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 2014); Bennett v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 721 F.3d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 2013); see also Godwin v. WellStar Health Sys., Inc., 615 Fed. Appx. 518 (11th Cir. 2015) (using Cat’s Paw analysis in an ADEA case that required but-for causation).
Judge Clement, writing for the Fifth Circuit panel in Zamora, stated the holding as follows: “…the applicable standard of causation is relevant only to the latter portion of this Staub test – instead of being a proximate cause, the supervisor’s act must be a ‘[but-for] cause of the ultimate employment action.’” (citation omitted) Zamora v. City of Houston, at 332. In doing so, Judge Clemente references Seoane-Vazquez v. Ohio State Univ., 577 F.App’x 418, 427-29 (6th Cir. 2014), where the Sixth Circuit substituted but-for causation for motivating factor causation in applying "Cat’s Paw" analysis in a post-Nassar case. With decisions like Zamora and the Fourth Circuit’s blockbuster holding in Foster v. Univ. of Md. – E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015), which held that Nassar’s but-for analysis only applies to direct-evidence cases, and not to McDonald-Douglas cases, the bar and the courts are confronted with the herculean task of drafting jury instructions that the jury can comprehend and that will pass muster in the appellate courts. Undoubtedly, some of these issues regarding causation will filter back up to the Supreme Court, and, hopefully, we will get more clarity on what causation scheme applies to the alphabet soup of statutory employment claims.
Please be sure to visit our website at http://RobertBFitzpatrick.com
Posted by Robert B. Fitzpatrick at 5:16 PM 3 comments
Friday, October 16, 2015
Non-Competition "In Any Capacity": Broad Scope Can Sink Your Non-Compete
A recent opinion from the Calvert County Circuit Court in Maryland
highlights a common drafting error which can undermine the enforceability of
non-compete agreements. In Electronic Security Servs., Inc. v. Higgs,
Judge Chandlee ruled that a non-compete which precluded the former employee
from working for a competitor “in any capacity” was overly broad and thus
unenforceable. See Case No.
04-C-15-304 (Calvert Cnty. Cir. Ct. Md. Sept. 2, 2015) (hereafter “Higgs”).
In Higgs, a company sued a former employee and the former
employee’s new employer, alleging that the employee breached a non-compete
agreement and the employee’s employment with the new employer was prohibited by
a confidentiality agreement. The
non-compete agreement forbade Mr. Higgs from “compet[ing] directly or
indirectly with the company by serving as an officer, partner, director, agent,
employee, or consultant with any firm or entities substantially engaged in a
business similar to or competitive to the business of the company or an active
client of the company in the last 2 years with the company.” It “extend[ed] to
the geographic area for the entire states of Maryland and Virginia, The
District of Columbia, and any other area that falls within a 150 mile radius of
Upper Marlboro.” Notwithstanding these restrictions, the employee went to
work for a competitor in a neighboring county.
The court found the agreement overbroad and unenforceable as a
matter of law, noting that it “effectively restricts [the former employee] from
obtaining employment from a competitor . . . in any role conceivable.” The
court further held that, even if such a broad restriction were somehow necessary
to protect the company’s legitimate business interests, the “need [was] not
remotely demonstrated in the complaint.” As a result, the court severed the
clause from the non-compete agreement, which “render[ed] the entirety of the
agreement void.”
The decision in Higgs
reflects a trend in non-compete litigation in favor of scrutinizing the scope
of the restrictions to which employees are subject. Several other states have
held that language similar to that present in Higgs is overly broad and therefore unenforceable – though some
courts have applied blue-penciling rules to save the agreement in a less
restrictive form.
In CopyPro, Inc. v. Musgrove, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that a non-compete agreement that prohibited a former sales
representative from working at a competitor in any capacity, “even as a
custodian,” was overly broad and unenforceable. 754 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. App. 2014).
In CopyPro the defendant,
former employee, Mr. Musgrove, had signed a non-compete agreement that
precluded affiliation with a competitor of CopyPro, a purveyor of office
equipment systems, for three years following the termination of his employment.
The substantive scope of the agreement was limited to “any business of the type
and character of the business engaged in by the Employer at the time of such
termination.” Id. at 192.
During his employment with CopyPro, Mr. Musgrove primarily worked
in Pender and Onslow County. After he resigned, Mr. Musgrove joined a competitor
to work in a different county, and he refrained from contacting CopyPro’s
customers in the two counties he had covered for CopyPro. Further, his
new employer forbade him from contacting CopyPro’s customers in said counties.
CopyPro nevertheless brought suit against Mr. Musgrove seeking,
among other things, a permanent injunction to enforce the terms of the
non-compete agreement that he had signed.
CopyPro prevailed in the Superior Court and obtained an injunction
preventing Mr. Musgrove, in pertinent part, from working for the allegedly
competitive entity. The Court of Appeals
reversed, explaining that “[a]s our decisions reflect, we have held on numerous
occasions that covenants restricting an employee from working in a capacity
unrelated to that in which he or she worked for the employer are generally
overbroad and unenforceable.” CopyPro,
754 S.E.2d at 192 (citing VisionAIR, Inc. v. James, 167 N.C. App. 504,
508-09, 606 S.E.2d 359, 362-63 (2004) (holding that a covenant that prohibited
an employee from “own[ing], manag[ing], be[ing] employed by or otherwise
participat[ing] in, directly or indirectly, any business similar to” the
employer’s business was overly broad and unenforceable)). The Court went on to hold that “such overly
broad restrictions are generally not enforceable in the employer-employee
context on the grounds that the scope of the restrictions contained in such
agreements far exceeds those necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate
business interests.” CopyPro, 754
S.E.2d at 193.
The Court noted that its decision here was distinguishable from
prior holdings:
Aside from the fact that
the restriction at issue in Precision Walls was to remain in effect for
only one year while the noncompetition agreement at issue here will remain in
effect for three years, the present record contains no indication that
Defendant ever had either the same level of responsibility or the same level of
access to competitively sensitive information as the defendant whose
conduct was at issue in Precision Walls. Simply put, the record
developed in this case, unlike the record developed in Precision Walls,
contains no evidence that Defendant had the responsibility for developing
client-specific pricing proposals or adjusting prices for competitive reasons
or that Defendant was involved in the development and operation of his
employer’s bidding or pricing strategies. Although Plaintiff contended in the
court below that Defendant might share vital information even if he were hired
by a competing business as a custodian, nothing in the present record indicates
that Defendant actually possessed sufficiently important information to render
him a competitive threat regardless of the position he held with a subsequent
employer.”
See Precision Walls, Inc. v. Servie, 568
S.E.2d 267 (N.C. App. 2002).
Of course, it is well established that non-competes such as those
described above are unenforceable in Virginia under the so-called “Janitor
Rule.” In Home Paramount Pest Control
Cos., Inc. v. Shaffer, the Supreme Court of Virginia found a non-compete
provision in an employment agreement overbroad on its face and therefore
unenforceable. 718 S.E.2d 762 (Va. 2011). Mr. Shaffer, the Plaintiff, was
an employee of Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, Inc. In January 2009, he
signed an employment agreement containing the following provision:
The Employee will not engage directly or
indirectly or concern himself/herself in any manner whatsoever in the carrying
on or conducting the business of exterminating, pest control, termite control
and/or fumigation services as an owner, agent, servant, representative, or
employee, and/or as a member of a partnership and/or as an officer, director or
stockholder of any corporation, or in any manner whatsoever, in any city,
cities, county or counties in the state(s) in which the Employee works and/or
in which the Employee was assigned during the two (2) years next preceding the
termination of the Employment Agreement and for a period of two (2) years from
and after the date upon which he/she shall cease for any reason whatsoever to
be an employee of [Home Paramount].
Id. at 414-415.
The Court explained that, in Virginia, a provision that restricts
competition “is enforceable if it is narrowly drawn to protect the employer’s
legitimate business interest, is not unduly burdensome on the employee’s
ability to earn a living, and is not against public policy.” Id. at 415.
The burden of proving each factor rests with the employer seeking court
enforcement of the restriction. Id. “When evaluating whether the
employer has met that burden, we consider the function, geographic scope, and
duration elements of the restriction. These elements are considered
together rather than as three separate and distinct issues.” Id. In Home
Paramount, the Court held that the provision was
unenforceable, noting that “[o]n its face, it prohibits Shaffer from working
for Connor's or any other business in the pest control industry in any
capacity. It bars him from engaging even indirectly, or concerning himself in
any manner whatsoever, in the pest control business, even as a passive
stockholder of a publicly traded international conglomerate with a pest control
subsidiary. The circuit court therefore did not err in requiring Home Paramount
to prove it had a legitimate business interest in such a sweeping prohibition.”
Id. at 418.
In NanoMech, Inc. v. Suresh, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, applying Arkansas law, affirmed the district court’s decision that
a non-compete agreement which prevented the employee from performing any work
for any competitor anywhere in the world was overbroad and unenforceable under
Arkansas law. 777 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2015) (Colloton, J.). In NanoMech,
defendant, former employee Ms. Suresh, had signed a non-compete agreement
before being hired at NanoMech, a company involved in the research and
development of nanotechnology. The non-compete agreement prohibited her
from “directly or indirectly” entering into, being employed by or consulting
“in any business which competes with the Company” for two years after her
departure. The covenant contained no geographic limitation and did not
define “any business which competes with” NanoMech. Ms. Suresh eventually
left NanoMech and joined a competitor as a chemist within the two-year
departure term. NanoMech sued to enjoin her from working there for the
remainder of the term of the non-compete and to prevent her from disclosing any
of NanoMech’s confidential information.
Generally, a non-compete agreement is enforceable under Arkansas law if the employer has a valid interest
to protect, the geographical restriction is not overly broad and a reasonable
time limit is imposed. The covenant’s plain language prohibited the employee
from working for any competitor of NanoMech, in any capacity, worldwide. The
Court rejected NanoMech’s argument that the covenant was reasonable due to the
global nature of the business and the employee’s broad access to trade secrets,
and refused to enforce the covenant, finding it was overbroad. The Court
held that global non-compete agreements may be permissible if the prohibitions
on employee activities are narrowly drawn.
Finally, in Clark’s Sales and Service, Inc. v. Smith and
Ferguson Enterprises, Mr. Smith, Defendant, was required to sign a
non-compete agreement by employer Clark's Sales & Service, Inc. after
several years of employment as a salesman. 4 N.E.3d 772 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014)
The key provisions of
the agreement stated that for two years after the employee’s termination from
employment, he was prohibited from, in any capacity:
[S]oliciting or providing services competitive
to those offered by his employer to any business account or customer who was a
business account or customer at any point in time during his employment;” and
“working in a competitive capacity with a named competitor of the employer in
the state of Indiana, in any city or state in which the competitor conducts
business, or to work for any business that provides services similar or
competitive to those offered by the employer during the term of his employment,
including but not limited to within the state of Indiana, Marion County, the
counties surrounding Marion County, or within a 50 mile radius of his principal
office with the employer.
Id. at 780. After the employee
resigned and went to go work for one a competitor, the employer filed suit to
enforce the non-compete and sought injunctive relief. The Court noted that its Supreme
Court has “long held that noncompetition covenants in employment contracts are
disfavored in the law, and we will construe these covenants strictly against
the employer and will not enforce an unreasonable restriction.” Id.
The Court of Appeals took issue with several parts of the agreement.
First, the Court found that the restriction on contacting or serving customers
was overbroad and unreasonable because it prohibited the employee from
servicing anyone who had been a customer at any point in time during his
employment. Id. at 782. Second, the Court viewed the scope of
prohibited activities as too broad because it went beyond the sales job he had
with his prior employer and prohibited him from engaging in any service that
offered but which he personally never performed during his employment-- i.e.,
drafted so as to prohibit “seemingly harmless conduct.” Id.
Third, the Court viewed the geographic restriction as “unquestionabl[ly]
unreasonable as written”, and stated that the 50-mile restriction alone might
have been acceptable, as “it is reasonable for individuals in the community to
travel up to 50 miles to visit Clark's.” Id.
If you’re considering
having your employees sign a non-compete, you should ensure that the
restrictions are narrowly drawn to address legitimate business needs. In other words, the primary inquiry should be
what relationships and knowledge the employee gained while employed by your
organization and what legitimate business concerns about the use of the
knowledge and relationships you hope to address. The more you can tailor your non-compete so
that it addresses your concerns but isn’t overly broad, the greater the chances
that it will be enforceable in most jurisdictions.
While much could be said
about the appropriate duration and scope of a restrictive covenant, those are
subjects for another day. What the
decisions above make clear is that, in drafting the substantive restrictions in
a non-compete agreement – or any other restrictive covenant – you should focus
on areas of actual concern. These might
include preventing an employee from working for a specific list of competitors,
preventing an employee from performing a specific job or function for entities
in similar line(s) of business, and soliciting current customers, vendors, or
employees. As demonstrated above, courts are skeptical of sweeping
language which prevents an individual from working for a competitor “in any
capacity.” Including such language,
especially in states which do not blue-pencil agreements, raises the very real
possibility that the entire clause or agreement will be stricken. Regardless of a state’s blue-penciling rules,
it is never advisable to gamble on how a court might re-write your agreement.
Instead, you should use language such as “in any position or performing any
function substantially similar to any position held or function performed by
the employee during the twelve-month period prior to the termination of her
employment.”
Posted by Robert B. Fitzpatrick at 5:47 PM 11 comments
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